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Closing the Back Door on Illegal 
Immigration:  Over Two Decades of 
Ineffective Provisions While Solutions Are 
Just a Few Words Away 
Phi Mai Nguyen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans have a history of disdaining both documented and 
undocumented immigrants,1 who are deemed to have created a 
cultural threat and economic burden for the United States.2  
Indeed, “[d]eliberate race-based exclusion has existed in America 
since its inception.”3  This negative mentality has translated into 
nearly a century of hostile immigration policies.  Congress first 
responded to the anti-immigrant sentiment with the 1882 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 2007, California 
State University, Fullerton.  This Comment is dedicated to my parents Nguyen Dinh 
Thong and Tran Thi Mai Phuong as well as my one and only sister Khanh Nguyen, 
without whose support I would not be where I am today.  I am very grateful to Michelle Q. 
Nguyen for her great mentorship and encouragement throughout my law review 
endeavors.  Special thank to Professor Marisa S. Cianciarulo and the Chapman Law 
Review staff for their unprecedented dedication to the publication of this Comment. 
 1 This Comment adopts the view of Professor Beth Lyon and uses the term 
“undocumented immigrants” to refer to non-U.S. citizens who presently possess no proof 
of any right to be present in the United States, the vast majority of which have not been 
declared deportable by the U.S. government. Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals 
Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized 
Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 576 (2004).  The term “illegal aliens” is “racially 
loaded, ambiguous, imprecise, and pejorative.” Id.  The term “unauthorized workers” is 
used to describe people “who are forbidden under the immigration laws to work for pay.” 
Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and 
Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2006).  In reality, commentators 
and authors have used the terms “illegal immigrants” and “illegal aliens” 
interchangeably.  To respect these authors’ choices of words, this Comment will retain the 
term “illegal immigrants” where necessary.  However, the use of “illegal immigration” is 
unaffected by this view because it simply characterizes a form of immigration that is 
against the law. 
 2 Richard A. Johnson, Note, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent Need for an 
Updated Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the 
United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 240 (2007). 
 3 Francine J. Lipman, Bearing Witness to Economic Injustices of Undocumented 
Immigrant Families: A New Class of “Undeserving” Poor, 7 NEV. L.J. 736, 738 (2007).  See 
also The CQ Researcher, Immigration Policy: A Historical Overview, in IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 11, 12 (Bruno Leone et al. eds., 1995) (describing the “nativist” sentiments of the 
Protestant Anglo-Saxon population—some of the first to settle in the United States—
toward the influx of European immigrants in the 1800s, which often resulted in violence, 
such as the three-day riot that took place in Philadelphia in 1844). 
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Immigration Act, which defined U.S. immigration policy for the 
first time.4  Within the same year, Congress passed the first 
Chinese exclusion law, which created an annual quota on the 
number of Chinese immigrants allowed into the United States.5  
Subsequently, in 1917, Congress passed another Immigration Act 
that not only restated all the exclusions previously legislated, but 
also barred most Asians and Pacific Islanders from entering the 
country.6  Then came, among others, the 1921 and 1924 Quota 
Limit Laws,7 the 1940 Alien Registration Act,8 and the Bracero 
Program,9 all of which aimed at restricting immigrants to the 
United States. 
As the nation expanded, U.S. immigration policy gradually 
became more liberal and evolved to accept more documented 
immigrants while placing tougher restrictions on those who were 
undocumented.  The highlight of this trend was the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986,10 which attacked the 
illegal immigration problem from a new front: the demand side.11  
The IRCA makes it unlawful for employers “to hire, or to recruit 
or refer for a fee . . . an alien knowing the alien is an 
unauthorized alien”12 and it imposes sanctions on employers who 
knowingly do so.13  Since opportunities for employment in the 
United States have by far been the primary motivation for 
immigrants to risk their lives to enter this country without 
proper documentation,14 Congress believed that eliminating 
employment opportunities—the demand side—would effectively 
deter undocumented immigrants—the supply side—from 
 4 The CQ Researcher, supra note 3, at 12. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 13. 
 7 LISA MAGAÑA, STRADDLING THE BORDER: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE INS 16 
(2003) (indicating that Congress enacted the Quota Limit Laws to set “specific restrictions 
on the entry of certain groups into the United States, among them Eastern Europeans, 
Africans, Australians, and Asians”). 
 8 Id. at 17 (stating that Congress passed the Alien Registration Act to require that 
the then INS—the equivalent of the current U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services—
register and fingerprint all immigrants considered “government subversives”—such as 
the Japanese, when World War II intensified and public sentiment against Japanese 
immigrants grew more severe). 
 9 See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 10 See generally The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a 
(2006).  It should be noted that the purpose of the IRCA was to modify the legal 
immigration provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act in several aspects.  Unless 
otherwise noted, section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act should be 
understood to mean the unmodified version of the statute (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a).  For 
further information, see H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5757. 
 11 The CQ Researcher, supra note 3, at 15. 
 12 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A). 
 13 § 1324a(a)(1)(A). 
 14 See infra Part II.B. 
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entering this country.  Under the IRCA, employers are required 
to verify their workers’ eligibility for employment, and a violation 
of this requirement results in fines and sanctions.15  The IRCA 
holds employers criminally and civilly liable for hiring 
undocumented immigrants so long as they have knowledge of the 
legal status of their prospective employees.16  The IRCA sought to 
create a sweeping effect of eliminating undocumented 
immigrants; it purported to close the back door on illegal 
immigration while opening the front door to legal immigration.17 
However, to date, the IRCA is far from achieving its goals.  
Although it attempted to eliminate opportunities for illegal 
immigration, the IRCA has failed because, “[t]he inward flow of 
undocumented immigrants grew exponentially in the years 
following its passage.”18  It is estimated that there were 
approximately twelve million undocumented immigrants in the 
United States by the end of 2008; nearly four times the amount 
that existed when the IRCA was first enacted in 1986.19  As 
scholars have noted, “[the IRCA] has failed to achieve its 
goals . . . [the] IRCA has caused our nation more harm than 
good . . . [the] IRCA increased the flow of undocumented workers 
and created an underclass of workers that have no rights.”20  The 
IRCA’s employer sanction provisions created little adverse 
impact upon employers.  It thus failed to discourage them from 
hiring undocumented immigrants, who were already eager and 
willing to work, despite the lack of protection from U.S. laws.21  
Furthermore, the courts have indirectly encouraged illegal 
immigration by conveniently refusing a number of remedies for 
unauthorized workers.22  As a result, employers face few, if any, 
repercussions should things go wrong during their employment 
 15 See infra Part I.D. 
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See generally id. 
 18 Tyler Grimm, Note, Using Employer Sanctions to Open the Border and End 
Undocumented Immigration, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 415, 425 (2009) (explaining that 
inadequate enforcement and the serious labor shortage in the United States resulted in 
an increase in the entry rate of undocumented immigrants for almost two decades 
following the passage of the IRCA).  Worse yet, in recent years, “enforcement of the IRCA 
has been almost completely abandoned.” Id. 
 19 Johnson, supra note 2, at 246; JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC 
CENTER, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES i (2009). 
 20 JUDITH P. MILLER & DAVID TANNENBAUM, WORKERS RIGHTS PROJECT, REPEALING 
IRCA LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 1 (2005), available at http://www.nmass.org/nmass/ 
breakthechains/Repealing_IRCA_LegislativePackage.pdf (discrediting the IRCA in 
general and clearly demonstrating that the IRCA works contrary to its goals).  Among 
other things, the authors argued that the IRCA has “inherited slave-like characteristics 
from the laws of slavery and involuntary servitude” and that the U.S. Supreme Court 
relied on the IRCA to limit all workers’ rights. Id. at 5. 
 21 See infra Part II.A. 
 22 See infra Part II.C. 
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relationship with undocumented immigrants.23  Finally, the 
IRCA’s knowledge standard is quite unavailing, as employers can 
easily produce evidence showing their lack of knowledge 
regarding the unauthorized status of their prospective 
employees, simply based on the reasonable validity of documents 
presented to them.24 
This Comment advocates for an amendment to the IRCA 
that would hold employers strictly liable for employing 
undocumented immigrants.  Employers should not be afforded an 
opportunity to absolve themselves from penalties and sanctions 
under the IRCA simply because of their purported lack of 
knowledge.  The moment they hire an undocumented immigrant, 
for whatever reason, they have violated the IRCA and should be 
severely penalized.  Employers, however, will not be left stranded 
with such a high standard.  A number of employment verification 
tools are available to them, often at no cost.  To effectively avoid 
the proposed strict liability, employers would be forced to utilize 
those effective mechanisms to detect the undocumented status of 
prospective employees instead of solely relying on the face value 
of the documents that are provided by those employees.  
Adopting a strict liability standard would inevitably lead to an 
increased penalty for employers should they violate the IRCA.25 
This Comment is composed of three parts.  Part I provides 
the background surrounding undocumented immigrants—the 
history of the IRCA and its effectiveness, or lack thereof, in the 
battle against illegal immigration.  This section will also 
acknowledge the importance of “E-Verify,” one of the most 
effective employment verification tools.  Part II provides an in-
depth analysis as to why the IRCA has failed to reduce illegal 
immigration. This analysis suggests that (1) the employer 
 23 See infra Part II.A. 
 24 See infra Part II.D. 
 25 Increased penalties, however, are outside the scope of this Comment as many 
commentators have discussed the successes and failures of employer sanctions, some 
arguing for more severe penalties, and others for eliminating them altogether. See, e.g., 
Jennifer K. Danburg, Strengthening Employer Sanctions Through Worker Identification 
Cards and a National Data Base: Effective Barriers to Illegal Immigration?, 9 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 525, 525–27 (1995) (discrediting Congress for imposing ineffective employer 
sanctions and proposing that those sanctions should be eliminated altogether because 
they will never be able to solve the fact that undocumented workers will always find 
employment opportunities); Grimm, supra note 18, at 436–37 (emphasizing that different 
sanctions should be implemented for different sectors since different parts of the economy 
will react differently to undocumented immigrant employment regulations); John B. 
Kaiser, IRCA’s Employer Sanctions Provisions Under Mester v. INS: Constructing a 
Constructive Knowledge Standard, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 681, 686–691 (1990) (asserting 
that sanction provisions under the IRCA are vague and open to subjective judicial 
determinations, and therefore ineffective in permanently alleviating the problems 
associated with illegal immigration). 
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sanction provisions of the IRCA are entirely ineffective, (2) the 
courts’ interpretations of the IRCA and their controversial 
decisions that withhold employee remedies have in fact 
encouraged illegal immigration, (3) undocumented immigrants 
will continue to work despite the lack of legal protection within 
the United States, and, most importantly, (4) the knowledge 
standard of the IRCA is unavailing.  Based on this analysis, Part 
III provides a viable solution—amending the knowledge standard 
of the IRCA to a stricter standard that holds employers strictly 
liable for the employment of undocumented immigrants. 
I.  ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE IRCA 
Since its colonization, the United States has welcomed 
millions of immigrants.26  After over three hundred years, people 
still travel to this country to seek employment and better 
opportunities for their families.27  Because immigration is an 
inherent component of this country, it is important to consider 
the existing attitudes of American citizens toward illegal 
immigration in order to at least partially explain why the IRCA 
was enacted, and also why it has failed. 
Many Americans are dissatisfied with undocumented 
immigrants because they view immigrants as people who take 
jobs away from U.S. citizens, and who create financial and social 
burdens for American society.28  Economists and commentators 
have called for comprehensive immigration reform to reduce, if 
not eliminate, illegal immigration, the persistence of which is 
considered to be the root of major problems in the United 
 26 IMMIGRATION AND ILLEGAL ALIENS: BURDEN OR BLESSING? 2 (Alison Landes et al. 
eds., 1995) (summarizing over 380 years of American history of immigration, in which the 
author indicates that immigrants had come to America since the founding of Jamestown 
in Virginia in 1607).  In 1790, the United States had a Caucasian population of over three 
million, comprised entirely of immigrants or descendants of earlier seventeenth and 
eighteenth century settlers. Id.  The population consisted of “75 percent British of 
Protestant origin (including Scottish immigrants), about 8 percent German, 4 percent 
Irish Catholic, and the rest mainly of Dutch, French, or Spanish descent.  In addition, 
approximately 500,000 Black slaves and perhaps an equal number of Native Americans 
lived within the borders of [the United States].” Id.  Therefore, whether descendants of 
early eighteenth and nineteenth century immigrants, or first-generation immigrants from 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States is almost entirely made up of 
immigrants. 
 27 Lipman, supra note 3, at 736–37.  Professor Lipman uses the turn of the twentieth 
century as a marking point.  This Comment, however, takes the year of the Declaration of 
Independence (1776) as the earmark of immigration, but the idea remains the same—
after hundreds of years, immigrants still come to the United States for a better life. 
 28 See, e.g., Adam M. Zaretsky, A Burden to America? Immigration and the Economy, 
REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 1997, at 5; Spencer S. Hsu, Cleaning Firm Used Illegal 
Workers at Chertoff Home, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2008, at A1. 
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States.29  Despite such pressure, undocumented immigrants 
continue to play a vital role in the economy, as well as in the 
development and success of this country.30  Together with 
documented immigrants, undocumented immigrants have long 
been an indispensable part of the U.S. labor force.31  Their 
presence compensates for shortfalls in a number of industries 
and occupations.32  Because of this demand for workers, 
undocumented immigrants continue to find employment in the 
U.S. labor force.33 
Despite such positive statistics, American hostility toward 
undocumented immigrants is not entirely unfounded.  
Undocumented workers represent one out of every twenty 
workers in the U.S. labor force.34  In addition, they tend to be 
under the age of forty and therefore are less likely to be disabled 
or retired, indicating that they will remain in the unauthorized 
workforce35 for quite some time,36 and thus perpetuate the 
 29 See generally IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, SPECIAL REPORT: BREAKING DOWN 
THE PROBLEMS: WHAT’S WRONG WITH OUR IMMIGRATION SYSTEM? 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Problem_Paper_FINAL_102109.
pdf; Richard A. Boswell, Crafting True Immigration Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7 
(2008). 
 30 Lipman, supra note 1, at 4–5 (indicating that “[e]ighty-five percent of eminent 
economists surveyed have concluded that undocumented immigrants have had a positive 
(seventy-four percent) or neutral (eleven percent) impact on the U.S. economy”).  
Additionally, Professor Lipman lists a number of sources that support the position that 
undocumented immigrants contribute to payroll and income taxes, social security, and 
employment insurance. Id. at 5 n.15. 
 31 In his research on immigrant workers, Rob Paral reported that “employers still 
cannot find sufficient workers in the housing, retail, and service industries,” despite the 
increase in the unemployment rate in June 2002.  Paral further found that  
[f]or American employers, Mexican immigration plays a critical role in efforts 
to maintain a sufficiently large pool of workers in part because of the close 
match between the needs of employers and the job readiness of Mexican 
immigrant workers, especially in ‘essential worker’ categories which are 
considered both unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
Rob Paral, Mexican Immigrant Workers and the U.S. Economy: An Increasingly Vital 
Role, 1 IMMIGR. POL’Y FOCUS 1, 5–6 (2002), available at 
http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/docs/Mex%20Imm%20Wor
kers%20&%20US%20Economy.pdf. 
 32 Id. at 4. 
 33 Lipman, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
 34 Id. 
 35 The terms “unauthorized worker” or “unauthorized workforce” are used to 
describe people who are forbidden under the immigration laws to work for pay. Lyon, 
supra note 1, at 576 (discussing appropriate terminology for non-U.S. citizens and their 
immigration status). 
 36 URBAN INSTITUTE, CROSSING BORDERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION (2004), 
http://www.urban.org/publications/900680.html (quoting Jeffrey Passel of the Urban 
Institute: “[Undocumented workers] tend to be young; there are very few over age 40 
statistically”).  In a report issued by the Pew Hispanic Center, Passel reported that while 
workers who are between the ages of forty-five and sixty-four are more likely to be retired 
or disabled and thus not in the labor force, very few undocumented workers fall in this 
age range, and thus are more likely to be working. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC 
Do Not Delete 9/13/2010 7:03 PM 
2010] Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration 621 
unauthorized employment problem within the United States, 
which interferes with the job market of otherwise authorized 
workers.  In addition, by virtue of their presence, undocumented 
workers cost Americans millions of dollars every year in added 
costs to public education, health care, welfare services, and the 
criminal justice system.37  As such, they are viewed as a burden 
on citizen taxpayers and a drain on state and local government 
resources.38  Indeed, in a 1995 report, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) examined three national studies of 
the benefits and costs associated with undocumented aliens and 
concluded that the costs outweighed the benefits to the U.S. 
economy.39  Such a controversial40 conclusion is supported by the 
number of experts that the GAO consulted while gathering 
information for the report,41 thus further stoking the sentiment 
that, as one U.S. Senator opined, “Illegal immigration is wrong—
plain and simple.”42 
Despite the existence of the IRCA, the number of 
undocumented aliens continues to rise.43  The IRCA has been the 
CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 25 (2005), 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.  Passel contends that if undocumented workers 
become disabled or retire, they are much more likely than others to leave the country. Id.  
Based on these facts, he argues it is reasonable to assume that most undocumented 
workers will remain in the United States for quite some time, given that most of them are 
under the age of forty. Id. 
 37 MICHAEL C. LEMAY, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 56 (2007). 
 38 Id. 
 39 U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: NATIONAL NET COST 
ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY 2–3 (1995) [hereinafter GAO’S NET COST ESTIMATES], available 
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95133.pdf (examining three national studies: 
(1) Donald Huddle’s initial study of 1992 net costs, The Costs of Immigration; (2) the 
Urban Institute’s critique of that study, How Much Do Immigrants Really Cost? A 
Reappraisal of Huddle’s “The Cost of Immigrants”; and (3) Huddle’s updated study, The 
Net National Costs of Immigration in 1993). 
 40 In the same year that GAO issued its report, Professor Alan O. Sykes, now the 
James and Patricia Kowal Professor of Law at Stanford Law School stated, “[T]here is no 
clear evidence that undocumented aliens as a group are a net drain on the public treasury 
once their contribution to tax revenues are taken into account.” Alan O. Sykes, The 
Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. 
Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 158, 191 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).  See also 
JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 296 (1989) (indicating 
that “[o]n balance . . . natives exploit illegal immigrants through the public coffers by 
taking much more from the illegals in taxes than is spent on them in public 
expenditures”). 
 41 The GAO consulted various experts in the field of immigration about issues that 
arose in assessing estimates of the fiscal impact of undocumented aliens, including Jeffrey 
Passel, the Urban Institute’s Director of Program for Research of Immigration Policy—
whose statistics and opinions are relied upon for various parts of this article—and Donald 
Huddle, an economist who once concluded that undocumented workers had cost the 
United States billions of dollars. See GAO’S NET COST ESTIMATES, supra note 39, at 34–55. 
 42 Spencer S. Hsu, Senate Democrats Address Immigration, WASH. POST, Jun. 25, 
2009, at A3 (quoting Sen. Charles E. Schumer). 
 43 See infra Part II.C. 
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subject of endless debates and criticisms over the past two 
decades.  Many blame the employer sanctions provisions for the 
failure of the IRCA.44  Others urge the U.S. judicial system to use 
reason and fairness to guide the resolution of the current 
immigration situation.45  Still others advocate for complete 
immigration reform.46  While these are valuable suggestions to 
solve the problem of illegal immigration, they overlook the roles 
of perhaps the most important soldiers in the battle against 
illegal immigration—U.S. employers—who are entirely capable of 
meeting the most desirable need of undocumented aliens: 
employment.47  Giving undocumented workers opportunities to 
make a living in the United States directly encourages them to 
enter the country unlawfully and remain undocumented once 
they find a way to earn a living.  This activity fosters more illegal 
immigration, despite the nation’s outcry for stricter regulation.  
Therefore, U.S. employers should be the focal point of the battle 
against illegal immigration. 
A.  Undocumented Aliens:  Who Are They and Why Are They 
Here? 
The number of undocumented immigrants in the United 
States amounted to nearly twelve million at the end of 2008.48  
Over time, four main categories of undocumented immigrants 
have arisen.  The first group includes those who come into the 
country without proper paperwork or authorization, typically 
crossing the southern border that the United States shares with 
 44 In her evaluation of the IRCA, Cecelia Espenoza argues that while the Act has 
failed to eliminate the push or pull to undocumented immigrants, it has created 
additional forms of discrimination against Hispanic and Asian citizens as well as other 
legal residents who are fully authorized to work. Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory 
Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 343, 347 (1995).  Espenoza advocates for the complete elimination of employer 
sanctions, which have resulted in discrimination while leaving the increase in illegal 
immigration unattended. Id.  She further maintains that the sanctions provided under 
the IRCA are ineffective in alleviating the problem of illegal immigration. Id.  See also 
Danburg, supra note 255, at 525. 
 45 See Marisa S. Cianciarulo, Can’t Live With ‘Em, Can’t Deport ‘Em: Why Recent 
Immigration Reform Efforts Have Failed, 13 NEXUS 13, 28 (2008) (asserting that decisions 
which lead to harsh punishments of undocumented workers only “perpetuate the 
misconception that undocumented workers have solely created and are solely responsible 
for the current immigration situation”); Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights 
and Illegal Immigration: How Implied Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman 
Plastic, its Predecessors and its Progeny, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1–2 (2008) 
(arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court reached the wrong result in Hoffman Compounds, 
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board and thus further encouraged illegal immigration 
when it denied backpay as a remedy for undocumented immigrants who had been 
terminated for their involvement in union activities). 
 46 See Lyon, supra note 1. 
 47 See infra Part II.A. 
 48 PASSEL & COHN, supra note 19, at i. 
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Mexico.49  The second includes those who enter the country with 
valid paperwork but stay beyond the time allowed on their 
visas—these are also called “the visa overstayers.”50  The third 
category includes those who enter the country with fraudulent 
documents.51  The final category is comprised of legal permanent 
residents who commit crimes that render them deportable.52 
Undocumented immigrants choose the United States as their 
destination country for a number of reasons, many of which 
pertain to the socio-economic conditions of the source countries.  
Economic hardship or political instability often induces 
immigrants to escape their home countries despite the risks 
associated with becoming undocumented in the United States.53  
For those who are eligible to obtain immigrant visas, the wait 
times are so long that they significantly discourage many eligible 
aliens.54 In addition to significant backlogs on application 
processing, the United States has statutory ceilings that limit the 
number of immigrant visas issued each year, prompting aliens to 
risk residing with their family members without legal status 
while waiting for their petitions to be processed.55  Most 
undocumented immigrants, however, do not have the luxury of 
waiting for such a long period of time to obtain immigrant visas 
because they do not have family members or employers whose 
sponsorship may permit them to apply for immigrant visas.56 
 49 LEMAY, supra note 37, at 1. 
 50 Id. at 1–2. 
 51 Id. at 2. 
 52 Id. 
 53 RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES SINCE 1986 CRS-5 (2004), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/39561.pdf (listing a number of factors that contribute to unauthorized 
immigration and explaining that “unauthorized migration is generally attributed to the 
‘push-pull’ of prosperity-fueled job opportunities in the United States”). 
 54 Id. at CRS-6.  As of October 31, 2009, the wait times for a Petition for Alien 
Relative application (I–130) ranged from five months for a spouse, parent or child under 
twenty-one, to nine years for a brother or sister.  While the wait times vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction—for example, the Nebraska or Vermont Service Centers may 
have different processing wait times—it is generally accepted that the wait times for 
relatives of U.S. citizens to become lawful aliens can be considerable, depending on the 
relationship between the aliens seeking to obtain legal status and their U.S. citizen family 
members. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov (follow 
“Check Processing Times” hyperlink; select “CSC - California Service Center” and click 
“Service Center Processing Dates”) (last visited Jan. 7, 2010) (detailing processing times 
for immigrant petitions and visas). 
 55 WASEM, supra note 533, at CRS-6 (explaining that, of the pending cases, 
reportedly almost two million are immediate relative and family preference petitions, and, 
as such, these family members sometimes risk residing without legal status to be with 
their families while waiting for their files to be processed). 
 56 Even when they have family members or employers to sponsor them, or when they 
give birth to U.S. citizens, once they cross the border illegally, they are statutorily 
required to return to their home countries for up to ten years before being eligible for 
readmission via approved petitions. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
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The most significant enticement to immigrate without proper 
documentation, however, is the possibility of employment, “which 
like a ‘magnet’ pulls illegal immigrants toward the United 
States.”57 Undocumented immigrants are motivated by the 
“prosperity-fueled job opportunities in the United States in 
contrast to limited or nonexistent job opportunities in the 
sending countries.”58 As such, they are willing to work for 
substantially less than what lawfully present U.S. workers would 
require, although in many situations that is still substantially 
more than what they would otherwise have earned at home.59 
Surprisingly, protection of U.S. law is not the key motivation 
of undocumented immigrants. In fact, they are barred from 
almost all governmental benefits, including food stamps, 
Medicaid, federal housing programs, and social security income, 
to name a few, as a consequence of residing in the United States 
without proper documentation.60 
B.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: History 
and Development 
Under pressure for immigration reform, Congress enacted 
the IRCA, which significantly altered the then existing 
immigration policy and programs.61 The IRCA purported to 
reduce illegal immigration by preventing undocumented 
immigrants from being lawfully employed in the United States.62  
The IRCA’s employer sanction provisions, which sought to 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (partially 
codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  Essentially, any previously undocumented 
presence in the United States does not count, even when undocumented immigrants are 
sponsored for immigrant visas. See MARK KRIKORIAN, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., 
DOWNSIZING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: A STRATEGY OF ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT 3 
(2005), http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back605.pdf (indicating that the IIRIRA of 1996 
effectively punished long-term illegal residence by barring undocumented immigrants 
from future re-entry for three or ten years depending on the length of their initial 
unlawful stay). 
 57 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 155 
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 58 WASEM, supra note 53. 
 59 KAREN D. JOHNSON-WEBB, RECRUITING HISPANIC LABOR: IMMIGRANTS IN NON-
TRADITIONAL AREAS 9–12 (Steven J. Gold & Rubén G. Rumbaut eds., 2003). 
 60 The only benefits that are federally required for undocumented immigrants are 
emergency medical care and elementary and secondary public education.  Nevertheless, 
many undocumented immigrants do not even have access to these few government 
services because of their constant fear of being deported.  As a result, some benefits are 
voluntarily given up in the hope of successfully remaining in the United States. Lipman, 
supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 61 Camille J. Bosworth, Note, Guest Worker Policy: A Critical Analysis of President 
Bush’s Proposed Reform, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1104 (2005). 
 62 See infra Part I.B.1. 
Do Not Delete 9/13/2010 7:03 PM 
2010] Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration 625 
penalize U.S. employers who knowingly hired unauthorized 
workers, were notably the most controversial part of the Act. 
i.  The Origins of the IRCA 
In 1942, faced with severe labor shortages in agriculture 
during World War II, a temporary-worker program was 
established to allow employers to hire workers from Mexico, on a 
temporary basis, for up to nine months per year.63  Congress 
subsequently enacted the Agricultural Act of 1949,64 which 
essentially expanded the previous temporary-worker program to 
the Bracero Program,65 which lasted until 1964.66  During this 
period, more than five million Mexicans came to the United 
States as temporary workers.67  The Bracero Program workers 
were paid low wages,68 enabling their employers to make much 
larger profits.69  When the program was officially ended in 1964, 
employers were left with a few options—moving their operation 
overseas, replacing human labor with machines, hiring 
undocumented immigrants, or simply going out of business.70  
Among these options, hiring undocumented immigrants appeared 
to be the least expensive solution, since hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants who continued to stay or came to the United States 
 63 Bosworth, supra note 61, at 1097. 
 64  Agricultural Act of 1949, S. Rep. No. 1130, 81st Cong. (1st Sess. 1949). 
 65 The Bracero was an agreement between the United States and Mexico to develop 
a plan for the importation of farm workers from Mexico to the United States.  The 
program allowed agricultural farm-workers to work in the United States for up to nine 
months each year.  “Braceros,” translated roughly as “farmhands,” were employed to meet 
the temporary labor needs, not to displace domestic workers.  The United States paid 
recruitment and transportation costs for workers to come to the United States.  There was 
a formal contract between the worker and employer with respect to the work conditions, 
and ten percent of the worker’s salary was to be deposited in a savings account and 
reimbursed upon return to Mexico. Id. at 1097–98. 
 66 Id. at 1099. 
 67 Id. 
 68 It was uncertain whether the wages paid to Mexican workers from the Bracero 
Program were lower than what farmers would have paid otherwise equivalent U.S. 
workers, mainly because the United States was undergoing a shortage of manual labor. 
Farmworkers.org, U.S. Need Farm Workers, http://www.farmworkers.org/usneedbp.html 
(last visited June 6, 2010).  The Bracero agreement was silent on the issue of comparative 
compensation. Farmworkers.org, The Official Bracero Agreement, 
http://www.farmworkers.org/bpaccord.html (last visited June 6, 2010).  However, the 
record indicates that wages paid to these Mexican farm workers were low enough that 
they benefited farmers. See Rural Migration News, Braceros: History, Compensation, Apr. 
2006, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/RMN/more.php?id=1112_0_4_0 (indicating that some 
economists in the 1920s had implied that farm workers were paid with low wages 
partially because farmers wanted to capitalize “on the basis of . . . cheap labor"). 
 69 See Rural Migration News, supra note 68 (indicating that, due to low wages paid 
to Mexican workers, “continued availability of Mexican labor” from the Bracero Program 
could help maintain high land prices). 
 70 See, e.g., Carolyn Dimitri & Anne Effland, Milestones in U.S. Farming and Farm 
Policy, AMBER WAVES, June 2005, at 10, 11, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
AmberWaves/June05/. 
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without authorization were in dire need of jobs.71  From the 
moment the Bracero Program ended in 1964 until the enactment 
of the IRCA in 1986, hiring undocumented immigrants was 
common practice.72 Moreover, although it was illegal for 
individuals to come to the United States without authorization, it 
was not illegal for employers to hire them.73  This led to a 
dramatic influx of illegal immigrants in the 1970s.74  At the 
conclusion of the Bracero Program, employers not only hired 
Mexican undocumented immigrants that were left unemployed 
from the program, but also other individuals in the 
undocumented immigrant pool.75 
Throughout the 1970s, the number of illegal immigrants 
continued to rise, and by the 1980s the United States harbored 
millions of undocumented immigrants.76  Such an alarming 
number of undocumented aliens prompted Congress to find a 
solution, and the IRCA was born as a result.77  The IRCA makes 
it unlawful for employers “to hire, or to recruit or refer for a 
fee . . . an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien,”78 
and it imposes sanctions on employers who knowingly violate 
this provision.79 
ii.  Employer Sanction Provisions 
Under the sanction provisions of the IRCA, employers who 
knowingly hire, recruit, or refer unauthorized aliens are subject 
to penalties ranging from $250- $10,000 per employed alien.80  It 
also imposes criminal penalties on those who engage in “pattern 
or practice violations.”81  These are typically fines of not more 
than $3,000 per alien, or imprisonment of not more than six 
months, or both.82  These provisions seek to prevent two types of 
 71 Bosworth, supra note 61, at 1103. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 1104. 
 74 Rural Migration News, supra note 68. 
 75 Id. (indicating that even before the Bracero Program ended, employers had hired 
both legal Braceros—Mexican farm workers from the Bracero Program—and 
undocumented Mexican immigrants who came to the United States with the hope of 
finding jobs as a result of the labor shortage after World War II).  See also The Bracero 
Program: 1942–1964, at 20, 21, 40, http://www.unco.edu/cohmlp/pdfs/Bracero_Program_ 
PowerPoint.pdf (indicating that throughout the duration of the program, from 1942 to 
1967, the number of Mexican undocumented immigrants rose to the point that it might 
have surpassed the number of Bracero workers). 
 76 Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer 
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 689 (1997). 
 77 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). 
 78 § 1324a(a)(1). 
 79 § 1324a(a)(1). 
 80 § 1324a(e)(4). 
 81 § 1324a(f)(1). 
 82 § 1324a(f)(1). 
Do Not Delete 9/13/2010 7:03 PM 
2010] Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration 627 
proscribed activities by employers.  First, they prohibit 
employers from hiring or continuing to employ an individual if 
the employer knows the individual is not authorized to obtain 
employment in the United States.83  Second, they provide for 
criminal penalties if the employer engages in a more egregious 
“pattern or practice” of hiring or continuing to employ such 
aliens.84  Criminal penalties were designed to discourage 
employers from continuing unlawful hiring practice with the 
mentality that they could simply pay for the civil fines as a 
regular cost of “doing business.”85 
C.  The Landscape of Illegal Immigration in the Post-IRCA Era 
Immediately after the passage of the IRCA in 1986, the 
number of undocumented immigrants dropped significantly, 
though artificially, from 1986 to 1989.86  Prospective undocu-
mented immigrants employed a wait-and-see approach to 
determine whether the United States was serious about 
enforcing its policies.87  When it became apparent that the United 
States was “not serious about enforcement and that the system 
could be easily evaded through the use of inexpensive phony 
documents,” undocumented immigration began to increase 
again.88  The number of undocumented immigrants, 3.2 million 
prior to the enactment of the IRCA, nearly doubled in the next 
ten years,89 and it continued to spiral upward to reach 
approximately twelve million at the end of 2008.90  Both 
Congress and President George W. Bush proposed new programs 
to set forth certain measures, since then-current immigration 
programs had failed to deliver the intended result.91  Congress 
began to spend more money to strengthen the border, only to 
 83 § 1324a(f)(1).  The legislative history of the IRCA indicates that criminal penalties 
were for “those employers who are unrepentant and make it in a general practice to 
knowingly hire undocumented aliens rather than follow the elementary provision of the 
[IRCA].” H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, supra note 10, at 50. 
 84 § 1324(f)(1). 
 85 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, supra note 10, at 50. 
 86 KRIKORIAN, supra note 56, at 4. 
 87 Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies explains that 
“[a]pprehensions of aliens by the Border Patrol—an imperfect measure but the only one 
available—fell from more than 1.7 million in 1986 to under a million in 1989.  But then 
the flow began to increase again as the deterrent effect of the hiring ban dissipated . . . .” 
Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Johnson, supra note 2, at 251. 
 90 PASSEL & COHN, supra note 19, at 1. 
 91 Emily B. White, How We Treat Our Guests: Mobilizing Employment 
Discrimination Protections in a Guest Worker Program, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
269, 280–81 (2007). 
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realize that the demand for human smugglers had dramatically 
increased.92 
In 2004, President Bush proposed a temporary worker 
program in an attempt to reform and mend existing American 
immigration policy.93  This proposed new program purported to 
expand the guest worker visa and provide new guidelines for U.S. 
employers in hiring foreign workers.94  The program was to 
operate like the Bracero Program95 to meet labor shortages.  As 
such, jobs would only be open to foreign workers when no U.S. 
worker was available.96  Like the Braceros, foreign workers 
participating in guest worker programs would be dependent upon 
their employers to maintain their visas.97 
However, Bush’s temporary worker program was only a 
temporary solution.98  Among other things, it did not provide 
incentives for foreign workers to obtain temporary visas, and it 
provided no wage or labor protections.99  Furthermore, at the 
conclusion of their visa durations, workers would still be required 
to return to their home countries, as the proposed program did 
not offer an amnesty provision or priority for permanent 
residency processing.100  In effect, the proposed program would 
likely have had little, if any, influence on the number of 
undocumented immigrants entering the country because it was 
incapable of meeting the demands of the agricultural industry in 
America and was not comprehensive enough to satisfy the 
employment needs of immigrants.101 
 92 Amanda E. Schreyer, Human Smuggling Across the U.S.-Mexico Border: U.S. 
Laws Are Not Stopping It, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 795, 796 (2006). 
 93 Bosworth, supra note 61, at 1110; White, supra note 91, at 280–81. 
 94 Bosworth, supra note 61, at 1110–11. 
 95 Kristi L. Morgan, Evaluating Guest Worker Programs in the U.S.: A Comparison 
of the Bracero Program and President Bush’s Proposed Immigration Reform Plan, 15 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 125, 134–36 (2004).  See also supra notes 61–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 96 Morgan, supra note 95, at 136. 
 97 Fwjustice.org, Guestworker Programs, http://www.fwjustice.org/Immigration_ 
Labor/GuestworkerBASICS.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2010). 
 98 Bosworth, supra note 61, at 1111.  Because the Bracero Program has been widely 
criticized, any new program that purports to create a temporary worker program will 
likely engender more criticism while leaving the issue of unauthorized employment of 
undocumented workers unsolved. See generally JORGE DURAND, THE BRACERO PROGRAM 
1942–1964: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2007), http://meme.phpwebhosting.com/~migracion/ 
rimd/revistas/rev9/e2.pdf. 
 99 Bosworth, supra note 61, at 1111–15. 
 100 Id. at 1114–15. 
 101 Id. at 1115. 
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D.  An Important Tool for Employment Verification:  “E-Verify”102 
Since the passage of the IRCA, employers must verify that 
every new-hire, citizen and noncitizen alike, is authorized to be 
employed in the United States.103  Some employers must collect 
employees’ documents based on the guidelines provided in the 
Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 from the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (one of the 
successors to the former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS)).104  The IRCA requires employers to verify documents 
submitted by prospective employees, and the risk of civil and 
criminal sanctions as provided in the IRCA urges employers to 
adopt measures to ensure the authenticity of those documents.105  
To reduce fraudulent documents designed to evade the process of 
employment verification, Congress enacted the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA).106 Initially, the IIRIRA established three pilot 
programs: the basic pilot program, the citizen attestation pilot 
 102 Department of Homeland Security, E-Verify, http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/ 
programs/gc_1185221678150.shtm (last visited June 2, 2010) [hereinafter Department of 
Homeland Security E-Verify]. 
 103  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)(B), 
(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).  The Department of Homeland Security has enforced this rule by 
requiring employers to ensure that employees fill out Form I-9 and provide appropriate 
documents to prove their eligibility to work. See Department of Homeland Security, Form 
I-9: Employment Eligibility Verification, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf (last 
visited June 2, 2010). 
 104 Department of Homeland Security, Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf (last visited June 2, 2010) (providing employers 
with guidelines about the types of documents required for employment verification.  
Certain documents provided by prospective employees could be used to establish their 
identity, or for employment authorization, or both.).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)–
(D), indicating that documents establishing employment authorization and/or identity 
include: 
[1] United States passport; [2] resident alien card, alien registration card, or 
other document designated by the Attorney General . . . [3] social security 
account number card; [4] other documentation evidencing authorization of 
employment in the United States which the Attorney General finds, by 
regulation, to be acceptable for the purposes of this section[;] . . . [5] driver’s 
license or similar document issued for the purpose of identification by a State, 
if it contains a photograph of the individual[; and] . . . [6] in the case of 
individuals under 16 years of age . . . documentation of personal identity of 
such other type as the Attorney General finds, by regulation, provides a 
reliable means of identification. 
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(D). 
 105  William A. Smith, Jr., Employers’ Obligations Under the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 37 (1989). 
 106 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208.  See also 142 CONG. REC. H10841, H10841–H10842 
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith), available at 
http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=763532451496+5+2+0& 
WAISaction=retrieve (calling for changes in existing immigration policy “by increasing 
penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud”). 
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program, and the machine-readable document pilot program.107  
Today, only the basic pilot program, commonly known as “E-
Verify,” is still in existence.108 
E-Verify is an online system operated by both the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Social Security 
Administration (SSA).109  It facilitates the process of employment 
eligibility verification by allowing employers to enter information 
from an employee’s I-9 form into an Internet-based government 
database within three working days of hiring.110  Such 
information is then crosschecked against the databases of the 
DHS and the SSA, and E-Verify immediately gives a tentative 
confirmation, or non-confirmation, of employment eligibility.111  
Tentative non-confirmation is the basis for further investigations 
by the government and a final decree is given to the employer 
within ten business days, thus allowing employers to know the 
eligibility of prospective employees within a very short amount of 
time.112  E-Verify is currently fully effective and available in all 
fifty states and some U.S. territories.113 
The use of E-Verify has become increasingly popular.  
Although Congress makes the use of E-Verify optional, as of 
August 2010, fourteen out of fifty states, pioneered by Arizona, 
have mandated the use of E-Verify by all or some employers.114  
In addition, Executive Order 12989, as amended by President 
George W. Bush in 2008, mandated the use of E-Verify for all 
employees working on any federal contracts115 and required that 
 107 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403(a)–(c). 
 108 MICHAEL FIX ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, MANDATORY VERIFICATION IN 
THE STATES: A POLICY RESEARCH AGENDA 6 (2008), http://www.uscis.gov/files/ 
nativedocuments/e-verify-mandatory-impl-evaluation.pdf. 
 109 Id. at 4. 
 110 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403(a)(3)(A). 
 111 Id. at § 403(a)(4)(A)–(B). 
 112 Id. at § 404(c). 
 113 Rachel Feller, Comment, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of 
Arizona’s Improper Legislation in the Field of “Immigration-Related Employment 
Practices,” 84 WASH. L. REV. 289, 300 (2009). 
 114 FIX ET AL., supra note 108, at 53–54.  See also NumbersUSA, Map of States with 
Mandatory E-Verify Laws, http://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/enforcement/ 
workplace-verification/map-states-with-mandatory-e-verify-laws.html (last visited Aug. 
11, 2010) (indicating that Arizona, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah have made the 
use of E-Verify mandatory to all employers while Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Virginia do so to only 
state agencies and/or contractors). 
 115 The government will refuse to procure goods and services from contractors who 
have not complied with immigration laws. Exec. Order No. 13465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33285 
(June 6, 2008) (positing that that “[a] contractor whose work force is less stable will be 
less likely to produce goods and services economically and efficiently than a contractor 
whose work force is more stable,” this Executive Order mandates that all government 
contractors utilize an employment verification tool to comply with immigration laws).  See 
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all federal contractors and subcontractors begin using E-Verify 
starting September 8, 2009.116  As of January 2010, more than 
180,000 employers were enrolled in the program,117 thus 
demonstrating its effectiveness in assisting employers in 
screening out prospective employees who are unauthorized to 
work.  E-Verify, like most other electronic databases, has 
produced occasional “false negatives”—those who appear 
ineligible to work but are in fact fully authorized to work—or 
“false positives”—those who appear to be eligible but are in fact 
not authorized to work.118  However, since the USCIS has spent 
the last twelve years cleaning, revising, and perfecting the 
database,119 it may be the best system currently in use for 
employment verification. 
The increasing ease and popularity of the E-Verify system 
has an important implication: employers now have the necessary 
tool to verify the legal status of their workers and thus have “no 
excuse” for hiring undocumented immigrants.120  E-Verify assists 
employers in two important ways: it reduces the burden on 
employers for immigration enforcement and it aids them in 
distinguishing between counterfeit and legitimate documents 
offered by prospective employees.121  It is free to all employers at 
the expense of Congress, which spent nearly $100 million on the 
program.122  Although the use of this system is optional, 
employers are adequately equipped with an important and 
effective tool to preclude the hiring of undocumented immigrants, 
and therefore should use E-Verify at all possible times. 
also Lindsay L. Chichester & Gregory P. Adams, The State of E-Verify: What Every 
Employer Should Know, 56 FED. LAW. 50, 52 (2009). 
 116 73 Fed. Reg. 33285.  See also DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, USER MANUAL FOR 
FEDERAL CONTRACTORS 4 (2009), http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/Federal% 
20Contractors/FEDK%20Employer%20Manual%209.3.09_FINAL.pdf. 
 117  DEPT. HOMELAND SECURITY, WESTAT EVALUATION OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM: 
USCIS SYNOPSIS OF KEY FINDINGS AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS 1 (2010), 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Native%20Docs/Westat%20Evaluation%20of%20the%20E-
Verify%20Program.pdf. 
 118 FIX ET AL., supra note 108, at 10. 
 119 Id. at 56. 
 120 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 57, 59 (Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2007_presidential_documents&docid=pd29ja07_txt-6.pdf 
(asserting that while we need to uphold our tradition of the melting pot that welcomes 
and assimilates new arrivals, we also need to enforce our immigration laws by giving 
employers the tools to verify the legal status of their workers). 
 121 Stephen A. Brown, Comment, Illegal Immigrants in the Workplace: Why Electronic 
Verification Benefits Employers, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 349, 354 (2007). 
 122 Department of Homeland Security E-Verify, supra note 102; FIX ET AL., supra note 
108, at 6. 
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II.  THE IRCA HAS PROGRESSIVELY ENCOURAGED ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION 
Like the issue it seeks to resolve—illegal immigration—the 
IRCA has been the topic of heated debate since its inception.  
Statistics have proven that the IRCA is not a successful strategy 
to decrease, let alone eliminate, illegal immigration.123  Countless 
factors have contributed to this failure.  Experts have long 
exhausted the topic of employer sanctions and their diminished 
role in deterring illegal immigration.124  The failures of employer 
sanctions have paved the way for increased employment 
opportunities for undocumented immigrants, which directly 
explains why they continue to make this country their second 
home, despite living outside the protection of U.S. laws.  While 
the battle against illegal immigration is not yet successful, courts 
have given a helping hand to employers who have violated the 
IRCA through a number of irresponsible decisions that send a 
dangerous message to employers—the “illegal treatment of 
undocumented workers will go virtually unpunished.”125  
Furthermore, embedded within the IRCA is a loosely-drafted 
knowledge standard which holds employers liable only if, they 
know of their employee’s undocumented status.126  Knowledge, 
however, is quite a subjective standard, and employers can 
satisfy it with certain internal control procedures, however 
ineffective they may be.127  All of these loopholes enable illegal 
 123 See supra Part I.C (indicating that the number of undocumented immigrants 
increased almost four-fold, from 3.2 million in 1986 to 12 million by the end of 2008; and, 
if Congress intended for the IRCA to decrease employment opportunities of 
undocumented immigrants as a way of reducing the number of undocumented 
immigrants, the IRCA has proven to be a failure, at least statistically). 
 124 See infra Part II.A (noting that numerous scholars have written about the 
complete failure of the employer sanction provisions of the IRCA, that many have 
advocated for the provisions to be eliminated altogether, and others have suggest 
amendments, as cited in infra notes 132–134).  See also supra note 25 and accompanying 
text. 
 125 Cianciarulo, supra note 45, at 27. 
 126 The current relevant provision of the IRCA states, “It is unlawful for a person or 
other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States 
an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1)(A) (2006).  
“Knowledge” includes constructive knowledge. See infra note 139. 
 127 See infra notes 185–187.  Further, since the term “knowledge” or “knowingly” is 
subject to interpretation, employers can create certain internal control procedures to 
purportedly ensure that their prospective employees are authorized to work in the United 
States.  Since the use of an electronic verification system, such as E-Verify, is not 
mandatory for all employers, these procedures can be entirely manual, such as making 
copies of two different types of identification cards, verifying employees’ previous 
employment, requiring prospective employees to answer affirmatively as to whether they 
are authorized to work in the United States, to name just a few.  These procedures, while 
appearing to show employers’ good-faith efforts, are ineffective because they will 
inevitably fail to detect fraudulent documents and they allow for the possibility of human 
error. 
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immigration to escalate and leave the IRCA outdated and highly 
criticized. 
A.  Employer Sanctions Provisions Do Not Effectively Deter the 
Practice of Hiring Undocumented Workers 
The effectiveness of the sanction provisions in the IRCA has 
been seriously questioned.128  In fact, ten years after the IRCA 
was first enacted, government agencies have asserted that the 
employer sanctions provided in the IRCA have failed to achieve 
their goals.129  While the provisions were created to discourage 
the practice of hiring undocumented immigrants, they instead 
operated to encourage substantial discrimination.130  There was 
evidence that employers were less likely to hire “foreign-
appearing” or “foreign-sounding” individuals who were otherwise 
fully qualified for the jobs available.131  Although there were 
provisions that allowed the possible repeal of employer sanctions 
in the case of widespread discrimination, the sanctions have not 
been repealed.132 
Minimal civil penalties have not deterred employers from 
hiring illegal immigrants.  Because each undocumented worker 
hired only costs an employer from $250-$10,000 in fines or 
penalties,133 underpaying these individuals during the course of 
their employment exceeds any expenses employers could incur 
from sanctions should they be caught.  In addition, employers 
have another means of getting around the sanctions provision—
changing their hiring methods.  There is growing evidence that 
employers use subcontractors, or recruiting agents.134  By doing 
so, employers avoid the requirements of the IRCA because 
 128 Danburg, supra note 25, at 530. 
 129 Employer Sanctions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 1995), available in LEXIS 
Legis Library, Cngtst File (highlighting that Maria Echaveste, the then Administrator of 
the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Dept. of Labor, testified that “there is now a 
broad-based consensus that employer sanctions as currently implemented have not 
worked,” and that some suggest that sanctions be repealed, while others call for reforms 
to strengthen the effectiveness of employer sanctions). 
 130 See generally U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: 
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 101ST CONG. 5 (1990) [hereinafter GAO Report], available 
at http://archive.gao.gov/d38t12/141005.pdf. 
 131 Id. at 6.  While the GAO acknowledged that its surveys were subject to certain 
limitations, it could not rule out the possibility that differences in hiring outcomes were 
attributed to “national origin discrimination.” Id. 
 132 See National Immigration Law Center, AFL-CIO Calls for Repeal of Employer 
Sanctions and Enactment of a New Legalization Program (Apr. 11, 2000), 
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/irca018.htm. 
 133 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 134 Julie A. Phillips & Douglas S. Massey, The New Labor Market: Immigrants and 
Wages after IRCA, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 233, 234 (May 1999). 
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subcontractors and their workers are not technically employees 
of the employer.135  Employers, therefore, do not have to bear the 
burden of employment verification, and take the employees as 
eligible to work so long as their subcontractors vouch for their 
valid employment authorization.  Through these methods, 
employers can absolve themselves from any potential liability 
and conveniently shift the blame to their subcontractors, even if 
the workers happen to be undocumented immigrants.136 
In addition to its civil sanctions, the IRCA criminal sanction 
provision aims at preventing employers from engaging in a 
pattern of hiring undocumented workers.137  The criminal 
sanction provision provides that employers are subject to 
imprisonment for “not more than six months” and a fine of up to 
$3,000 per employed alien.138  On its face, the criminal liability 
provision seems to preclude employers from treating civil 
penalties as a cost of “doing business,” or using recruiting 
agencies to absolve their own liabilities.  Nevertheless, employers 
who engage in the pattern of hiring undocumented workers have 
recognized that the “knowledge” requirement in the IRCA is 
subject to judicial interpretation.139  As such, some employers 
have chosen to take some calculated risks and continue to hire 
undocumented workers because the financial benefits of doing so 
substantially outweigh the risks of getting caught or being forced 
to pay civil or criminal penalties under the IRCA.140 
As a result, the struggle with illegal immigration continues.  
As the 1990 GAO report indicated, employer sanctions have led 
to widespread discrimination, and it is disputed whether they 
actually met the goal of decreasing illegal immigration.141  Some 
studies show that, despite the initial result of decreased illegal 
immigration, employer sanctions under the IRCA fail to provide 
a long-term solution.142  Sanctions have not deterred employers 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1). 
 138 § 1324a(f)(1). 
 139 In the case of Mester Mfg. Co. v. I.N.S. the defendant argued that as a matter of 
law, it did not have knowledge of the status of the aliens.  The defendant also advanced 
its argument as far as requiring the government to notify it that its employee’s green card 
was invalid, which serves as a helpful illustration to the point above that employers try to 
manipulate the meaning of “knowledge” in the IRCA to avoid liability. Mester Mfg. Co. v. 
I.N.S., 879 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1989).  See also U.S. v. Fragale, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12616 (over a decade after the enactment of the IRCA, this employer still advanced, 
though unsuccessfully, the argument surrounding the uncertainty of the term 
“knowledge”). 
 140 Jeffrey L. Ehrenpreis, Controlling Our Borders Through Enhanced Employer 
Sanctions, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2006). 
 141 GAO Report, supra note 130, at 3; Danburg, supra note 25, at 530–31. 
 142 Danburg, supra note 25, at 531. 
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from hiring undocumented workers.143  This is demonstrated by 
the progressively increasing population of undocumented 
immigrants reported by the Pew Hispanic Center after the 
passage of the IRCA in 1986.144 
B.  The Lack of Protection of U.S. Laws Does Not Deter 
Undocumented Immigrants from Seeking Employment 
The legislative history of the IRCA indicates that Congress 
believed employment to be the main factor that draws 
undocumented aliens to the United States.145  Indeed, 
undocumented immigrants come to the United States in the hope 
of obtaining jobs, not for protection under U.S. labor laws.146  In 
doing so, they are willing to work at below-market wage rates as 
long as they are employed.147  The harsh working conditions 
offered by U.S. employers, despite being illegal per American 
standards, are quite acceptable to those who have risked their 
own lives to come to this country in search of a better future.148  
After all, working in harsh and unsafe conditions is much better 
for many than losing lives in political unrest or living in poverty 
in their home countries. 
As members of the “secondary labor market,” undocumented 
workers “gravitate toward jobs involving irregular employment, 
low wages, and poor working conditions,” all of which U.S. 
employees either refuse to tolerate without substantial warranty 
of safety.149  Undocumented immigrants have worked for brutally 
long hours at wages below the legal limit, with high rates of 
 143 Espenoza, supra note 44, at 347. 
 144 PASSEL & COHN, supra note 48, at 36 (estimating the unauthorized immigrant 
population as in thousands 3,525 in 1990, 8,375 in 2000, 11,100 in 2005, and 11,900 in 
2008). 
 145 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, supra note 10, at 46 (showing Congress was convinced that 
the opportunity to secure employment illegally in the United States not only drew aliens 
to the country but it also encouraged nonimmigrant aliens to work unlawfully). 
 146 Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 147 Id.  See also U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Public Information: 
Worksite Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/pi/worksite/index.htm (last visited June 16, 
2010) (finding “[i]llegal workers frequently lack the employment protections afforded 
those with legal status and are less likely to report workplace safety violations and other 
concerns,” such as being paid substandard wages). 
 148 See, e.g., Boatpeople.org, A True Story, http://www.boatpeople.org/a_ 
true_story.htm (last visited January 2, 2010) (depicting horror stories of Vietnamese 
refugees trying to escape Communism by traveling by boat to America, during which they 
were plundered, sexually assaulted, and even killed by Thai pirates); 130 Are Said To Die 
in Pirate Attack on Vietnamese Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1989, at 11 (reporting that 
“[t]he attackers, armed with shotguns and hammers, shot and bludgeoned refugees to 
death after raping several of the women aboard . . . The seven pirates then set the refugee 
boat ablaze . . . Other refugees died of exhaustion after floating in the sea clinging to dead 
bodies of fellow refugees”). 
 149 Espenoza, supra note 44, at 350. 
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injuries and deaths.150  In addition, these individuals often do not 
report such harsh working conditions for fear of deportation.151  
Horror stories about the mistreatment of undocumented workers 
in the workplace are not new to the public.  Out of the one 
hundred eleven people who died on the job in New York City in 
2000, seventy-four were immigrant workers.152  Chinese 
undocumented immigrants, for example, are forced to work at 
least one hundred hours per week in the New York garment 
district.153 
Undocumented workers’ willingness to work under harsh 
conditions and for less than adequate compensation encourages 
employers to hire these individuals for unskilled positions.154  
Essentially, these employers and their unauthorized employees 
have an interlocking relationship from which mutual benefits 
derive.  The employers can lower the workers’ wages, and 
workers in turn can make a living while remaining in the United 
States without proper documentation. 
Numerous organizations have advocated for the rights of 
undocumented immigrant workers.155  The Asian American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, for example, promotes the rights of 
Asian American immigrants.  It has noted that “‘[e]mployer 
sanctions have undercut working conditions for all American 
workers by creating an underclass of undocumented workers who 
have no rights and are forced to work under slave-like conditions, 
for pay that no American worker can survive on.’”156 
C.  Withholding Employees’ Remedies Does Not Solve, but 
Rather Encourages, Illegal Immigration 
Despite the passage of the IRCA, undocumented immigrants, 
once employed, are still recognized as “employees” under the 
National Labor Relations Act157 (NLRA) and Fair Labor 
 150 JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 2 
(2005). 
 151 Thomas Maier, Blood, Sweat, Tears: Chinese Sweatshop Workers are Among Most 
Exploited, NEWSDAY, July 26, 2001, at A6, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/ 
death-on-the-job-immigrants-at-risk-blood-sweat-tears-chinese-sweatshop-workers-are-
among-most-exploited-1.797602. 
 152 GORDON, supra note 150, at 2. 
 153 Maier, supra note 151, at A6. 
 154 Espenoza, supra note 44, at 350–51. 
 155  Press Release, The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Call to 
Repeal IRCA Employer Sanctions Provisions, (Sept. 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.aaldef.org/article.php?article_id=63. 
 156 Id. (quoting Nancy Eng from the Chinese Staff & Workers Association). 
 157 The Act requires employers to reinstate the employee and to make him whole for 
any wages or benefits lost as a result of the discharge. National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3) (West 2007) (providing that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for 
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Standards Act158 (FLSA).159  Although Congress could have 
excluded undocumented immigrants from NLRA and FLSA 
protection, it did not do so according to the plain language of the 
IRCA.160  In fact, the legislative history of the IRCA indicates a 
strong Congressional intent to preserve protection for 
undocumented immigrants as “employees” under the NLRA and 
FLSA.161  Court decisions in the years after the passage of the 
IRCA have reflected such an understanding.  In Patel v. Quality 
Inn South, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the word 
“employee” should be construed broadly to include all workers 
not specifically exempted.162  The court reasoned that the 
provisions of the FLSA allowed employees to bring an action 
against their employer to recover any unpaid wages and 
overtime, where the term “employee” means “‘any individual 
employed by an employer,’” which includes undocumented 
immigrant employees.163  The court further asserted that this 
interpretation went hand in hand with the IRCA because the 
IRCA was not intended to limit the rights of undocumented 
aliens under the FLSA.164  Undocumented aliens enter the 
United States without proper documentation to seek employment 
at any wage, not protection of the U.S labor laws.165  Allowing 
these individuals to seek appropriate remedies from employers’ 
wrongdoing would discourage employers from hiring 
undocumented immigrants with the intent of exploiting them.166  
The Patel decision was, therefore, consistent with Congressional 
intent. 
an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term 
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization . . .”). 
 158 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West 2007) (setting 
mandatory minimum wages for employees as well as other protections against wage loss 
and discrimination). 
 159 See Myrna A. Mylius Shuster, Note, Undocumented Does Not Equal Unprotected: 
The Status of Undocumented Aliens Under the NLRA Since the Passage of the IRCA, 39 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 609, 618–19 (1989).  See also Patel, 846 F.2d at 706 (holding that 
“undocumented workers are ‘employees’ within the meaning of the FLSA”). 
 160 Nowhere in its statutory language does the IRCA negate the rights of 
undocumented workers in the workplace.  Although the Act governs the hiring of these 
individuals, it does not strip them of protection during their employment. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 
(2006). 
 161  See Patel, 846 F.2d at 702 (noting that Congress intended the term “employee” to 
be broadly defined). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(e)(1)). 
 164 Id. at 704. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 704–05. 
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Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court unjustifiably decided 
to depart from Congressional intent.167  The Court, in a five-to-
four decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor 
Relations Board, concluded that whenever there is a potential 
conflict between the remedies provided in the NLRA and federal 
immigration policy, such as the IRCA, the NLRA may be 
required to yield.168  In Hoffman, Jose Castro was an 
undocumented immigrant who presented false documents to 
obtain employment with Hoffman, a manufacturer of custom-
formulated chemical compounds.169  During the course of his 
employment, Castro supported a union-organizing campaign on 
his employer’s premises and was subsequently laid off due to 
such involvement.170  The National Labor Relations Board found 
that Hoffman violated the NLRA by laying-off Castro to rid itself 
of known union supporters and ordered the company to, among 
other things, offer backpay to the employee.171  The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed this order and held that an undocumented 
employee could not claim backpay under the NLRA.172  The Court 
reasoned that, because granting undocumented immigrants the 
right to backpay as a remedy under the NLRA would essentially 
encourage violation of the IRCA, providing such an award “to 
illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies 
the [National Labor Relations] Board has no authority to enforce 
or administer.”173 
The Hoffman Court based its conclusion on the premise that 
the employee could not lawfully have earned those wages because 
he was not authorized to work in the United States in the first 
 167 See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 
137 (2002) (refusing to grant backpay to an undocumented worker who was unlawfully 
terminated for his involvement in union activities).  Hoffman created confusion among 
lower courts and perpetuated inconsistent applications.  The following cases support the 
proposition that undocumented workers are “often” denied legal remedies. See, e.g., 
Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that 
undocumented workers were not allowed to recover economic damages including 
backpay); Escobar v. Spartan Security Service, 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) 
(holding that unclean hands prevented recovery).  But see De La Rosa v. Northern 
Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238–39 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Hoffman did not apply because the present case did not involve 
backpay). 
 168 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.  Accord. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 
(1942) (holding that the Court “has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the 
Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally 
important Congressional objectives”). 
 169 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 140–41. 
 172 Id. at 146–47. 
 173 Id. at 149. 
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place.174  This premise is problematic.  The Court ignored the 
simple fact that it takes two to create an employment 
relationship.  Castro could not have obtained employment had it 
not been for Hoffman’s acceptance of his documentation.  Had 
Hoffman performed its due diligence by ensuring the legitimacy 
of the documentation, it would have discovered the 
undocumented status of Castro.  If an employer does not use a 
verification device, like E-Verify, the employer is equally culpable 
for the employment of an undocumented worker.175  The Court 
conveniently ignored the employer’s participation in the unlawful 
hiring of Castro and made a one-sided, pro-employer conclusion 
that awarding backpay ran counter to the policies of the IRCA.  
In reality, withholding backpay condones illegal immigration 
because opportunistic employers like Hoffman recognize the 
benefits of hiring undocumented immigrants, and will capitalize 
on such illegitimate economic advantages that result from their 
unlawful conduct.176 
Since Hoffman was decided in 2002, lower courts have been 
confused about the application of the IRCA and to what extent it 
should overrule other federal statutes, such as the NLRA.177  
Some courts have interpreted Hoffman narrowly and only 
applied its rationale to cases of disputed backpay under the 
NLRA.178  Others have interpreted Hoffman broadly as a blanket 
approval for denying other remedies, not just backpay, to 
undocumented workers.179  Such a situation is entirely contrary 
to the congressional intent that was explicitly articulated in the 
House Report during the consideration and passage of the IRCA: 
It is not the intention of the Committee that . . . the [IRCA] . . . be 
used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in 
 174 Id. 
 175 The facts of Hoffman indicated that “Castro presented documents that appeared to 
verify his authorization to work in the United States.” Id. at 140 (emphasis added). 
 176 Brief for Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, at 13, Hoffman Plastic Compound v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137 
(2002) (No. 00–1595). 
 177 María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States 
Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison with 
Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 323–24 (2005). 
 178 See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found. Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (adopting a more limited view of Hoffman by holding that an injured 
subcontractor’s employee’s legal status did not deprive the employee of his right to lost 
wages). 
 179 See, e.g., Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1337 (M.D. 
Fla. 2003) (denying an award of lost wages to the estate of an undocumented worker who 
died from injuries sustained in a forklift accident at a construction site and equating 
backpay and lost wages, indicating a broad application of Hoffman); Sanchez v. Eagle 
Alloy, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Mich. 2004) (Markman, J., dissenting) (stating that 
workers should not collect worker’s compensation benefits upon employer being notified of 
undocumented status, because such a contract would be void as against public policy). 
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existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations 
boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair 
practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising 
their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected 
by existing law.  In particular, the employer sanctions provisions are 
not inten[d]ed [sic] to limit in any way the scope of the term ‘employee’ 
in . . . [the NLRA].180 
The Hoffman Court’s failure to provide remedies for 
undocumented workers encourages employers to continue their 
current practice of hiring undocumented workers, despite the 
risk of violating the IRCA.  Decisions like Hoffman “enable and 
validate the perpetuation of an exploitable subclass of 
workers.”181  Instead of punishing employers who routinely offer 
employment to undocumented immigrants, courts have shifted 
the punishment to undocumented workers.  Since the IRCA 
sanctions have been proven to be ineffective, and few, if any, 
remedies are afforded for undocumented alien workers, 
employers continue to benefit from the practice of hiring, 
underpaying, and refusing to reinstate backpay for these 
individuals.  Hoffman essentially signals to employers that they 
can continue their practices, which effectively condones illegal 
immigration. 
D.  The IRCA’s Knowledge Standard Is Unavailing 
The IRCA provides that employers commit unlawful 
employment of unauthorized aliens when they hire, or continue 
to employ, an alien “knowing the alien is an unauthorized 
alien.”182  In addition, the government bears the burden of 
proving that the employer “knowingly employed an unauthorized 
alien.”183  The plain language of the statute makes it clear that, 
absent the element of knowledge, no violation can be found.  
Nevertheless, prior to the amendment of the Code of Federal 
Regulations in 2007, neither the final version of the IRCA nor its 
corresponding regulations contained a definition of the word 
“knowingly.”184  Consequently, from 1986 to 2007, while the 
government carried an enormous burden of proof, employers took 
the liberty of manipulating the term “knowingly” to their 
 180 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, supra note 10, at 58. 
 181 Cianciarulo, supra note 45, at 28. 
 182 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 183 § 1324a(e)(3)(C) (indicating that the standard of proof for an administrative law 
judge to determine whether an employer has violated subsection (a), i.e. unlawfully 
employing unauthorized aliens, is by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 184 Kaiser, supra note 25, at 695.  On August 15, 2007, almost twenty-one years after 
the enactment of the IRCA, a number of safe-harbor procedures for employers were 
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1 (2010).  For more information see infra note 189. 
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advantage.185  Courts have expressed concern that the knowledge 
requirement of the IRCA is vague and confusing, and have 
pointed out the absence of any useful guidance in legislative 
history.186 
Absent useful guidance and definitions for the terms 
“knowingly” and “knowledge,” commentators have restlessly 
sought to apply the knowledge standard.  Some argue that 
“knowingly” requires employers to have “actual” knowledge of an 
alien’s unauthorized status.187  Others, including the Ninth 
Circuit in Mester Mfg. Co. v. I.N.S., have adopted the 
constructive knowledge standard,188 which was later adopted in 
the Code of Federal Regulations.189  While the constructive 
knowledge standard seems to be the predominant view, 
commentators have criticized it, stating that “[c]onstructive 
knowledge is not knowledge.”190  Even the “reckless and wanton 
disregard”191 standard seems to be too loose because it only 
imposes on employers a duty to investigate that which a 
reasonable person would investigate, and absolves them from 
liability when employers act in a non-reckless manner.192  
Whether it is actual knowledge, constructive knowledge, or 
reckless disregard, the standard is still too loose to effectively 
deter illegal immigration because it creates many loopholes for 
employers to freely employ unauthorized workers as long as the 
 185 Mester Mfg. Co. v. I.N.S., 879 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 186 Id. at 567–68 (indicating that the statute does not provide a definite answer for 
the question: “[w]hen must an employer terminate an employee upon learning that he or 
she is unauthorized to work in the United States?”).  In a footnote, the court commented, 
“Nor does the legislative history provide useful guidance.” Id. at 567 n.8. 
 187 Mary L. Sfasciotti, Employer Sanctions Under the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, 76 ILL. B.J. 384, 386 (1988) (explaining that the lack of actual 
knowledge of an employee’s undocumented status should be a defense to employer 
liability when the employer relied on fraudulent documents); Nancy-Jo Merritt, The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: What Employers Need to Know, 22 ARIZ. 
B.J. 6, 8 (1987) (indicating that employers will not be sanctioned unless they have actual 
knowledge of an employee’s lack of employment authorization). 
 188 Mester Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d at 567; Kaiser, supra note 25, at 683. 
 189 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(l)(1) (2010) (providing that constructive knowledge is “knowledge 
which may fairly be inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances which 
would lead a person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know about a certain 
condition”).  The Code also lists a number of examples of employer actions where 
constructive knowledge may be imputed when the employer 
[f]ails to complete or improperly completes the Employment Eligibility 
Verification Form, I-9; [h]as information available to it that would indicate 
that the alien is not authorized to work . . . or [a]cts with reckless and wanton 
disregard for the legal consequence of permitting another individual to 
introduce an unauthorized alien into its work force or to act on its behalf. 
Id. 
 190 Kaiser, supra note 25, at 697. 
 191 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(l)(1)(iii). 
 192 Kaiser, supra note 25, at 702. 
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government cannot prove a guilty intent.  This partly explains 
why there has been so much litigation surrounding employers’ 
knowledge since the IRCA went into effect in 1986, while leaving 
the battle against illegal immigration unsuccessful.  The next 
section will provide a practical and viable solution to ensure that 
employers think twice before making a hiring decision. 
III.  EMPLOYERS SHOULD TAKE A MORE PROACTIVE APPROACH IN 
THE BATTLE AGAINST ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
Although the IRCA created employer sanctions to hold 
employers responsible for making a preliminary determination of 
an employee’s legal status before hiring,193 there is overwhelming 
evidence that employer sanctions have done little to deter 
employers from hiring undocumented immigrants.  So long as 
employers can show their lack of knowledge of an employee’s 
undocumented status, they are effectively absolved from liability.  
The knowledge standard is too vague to provide adequate 
guidelines for courts and law enforcement to impose sanctions on 
employers.  Because decreasing employment opportunities for 
undocumented immigrants is, by far, the most practical way of 
discouraging illegal immigration, employers must be held to a 
strict liability standard. 
Since employers now have everything they need to prevent 
the unlawful practice of hiring undocumented immigrants, and 
undocumented immigrants have few, if any, available remedies 
should things go wrong during the course of their employment, 
employers should carry the burden of ensuring that none of their 
employees are undocumented immigrants.  Congress should 
amend the IRCA to impose sanctions on employers regardless of 
their actual knowledge, constructive knowledge, or reckless 
disregard of their employees’ unauthorized status.  The current 
relevant provision of the IRCA states, “It is unlawful for a person 
or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for 
employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is 
an unauthorized alien.”194  Congress should eliminate the term 
“knowing” in section 1324a and revise the statute as follows: 
It is unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or 
refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an unauthorized 
 193 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10.  With the passage of the IRCA in 1986, Congress essentially 
placed a burden on employers to make a preliminary determination regarding the legal 
status of an employee before hiring him or her.  The employer sanctions provisions in the 
IRCA impose a duty on employers to refrain from knowingly employing undocumented 
aliens. 
 194 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1)(A) (2006). 
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alien regardless of the person or entity’s knowledge that the 
alien is an unauthorized alien. 
This proposed amendment essentially imposes strict liability 
on employers and requires them to take charge of their hiring 
processes by utilizing all the verification tools available to them 
to prevent the hiring of undocumented immigrants. 
At common law, strict liability makes people liable for their 
actions regardless of fault or intent.195  The strict liability 
standard is not overly rigid.  Employers are still afforded plenty 
of reasonable mechanisms to detect an unauthorized worker.  
The Ninth Circuit has provided that the “inability to speak 
English is a factor, among others, which may be considered in 
determining [an employers’] knowledge that a person is in the 
United States illegally.”196  While employers often raise the 
objection that “it is unreasonable to expect businesspeople to 
distinguish between fake and real driver’s licenses and Social 
Security cards,”197 there is nothing unreasonable about it.  
Although employers may be able to rely on the facially 
reasonable validity of prospective employees’ documents, they are 
not obligated to do so.  In fact, they should not rely solely on the 
documents presented by prospective employees in making hiring 
decisions precisely because there is always the possibility of 
human error in addition to fraud on the part of the prospective 
employees.  With free access to E-Verify,198 a highly efficient 
system that grants employers instant access to determine the 
legal status of prospective employees, employers are equipped 
with an adequate tool to screen out unauthorized workers.199  E-
Verify will help to ensure that the information provided in such 
documents is reliable and that a prospective employee is eligible 
 195 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009). 
 196 Hernandez v. Balakian, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (citing United 
States v. Holley, 493 F.2d 581, 582–83 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 197 Hsu, supra note 28, at A8. 
 198 See supra Part I.D. 
 199 E-Verify is not a magical tool, however.  It has its fair share of flaws and defects, 
which require continuous improvement. See FoxNews.com, E-Verify Misses Half of Illegal 
Workers, Report Finds, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/02/25/e-verify-misses-half-
illegal-workers-report-finds (last visited June 14, 2010) (criticizing E-Verify for rendering 
false flags against U.S. citizens and legal immigrants).  This report provides contradictory 
findings that E-Verify correctly identifies authorized workers ninety percent of the time, 
while pointing out that even the Department of Homeland Security admits that E-Verify 
is accurate only nearly half of the time. Id.  Nevertheless, Congress budgeted about 
$100 million for the improvement of this system in 2010, which signals a potentially 
substantial improvement of E-Verify in the next few years.  Given that E-Verify 
dominates the employment verification market, it appears to currently be the best 
alternative to Form I-9 for the purpose of determining employees’ eligibility to work.  See 
supra notes 115–119. 
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to work in the United States200  Even if workers intentionally lie 
or present counterfeit documents to obtain employment, E-Verify 
will coordinate with both the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Social Security Administration to assist employers in 
detecting fraud. 
After all, if employers find that hiring an undocumented 
employee elicits severe consequences, they will be discouraged 
from doing so.  Strict liability is the only solution that will close 
the loopholes in the IRCA and ensure that employers seriously 
comply with the employment verification requirements.  
Mandatory use of E-Verify is not necessary at this point.  Once 
employers recognize how important E-Verify is to avoid strict 
liability, it will be more widely used on a voluntary basis. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined the most important reason why 
the IRCA has failed to achieve its goals—the knowledge standard 
is too loose to discourage violation—and has provided an 
exhaustive analysis as to why a strict liability standard will work 
much better in deterring the hiring of undocumented 
immigrants, which will in turn reduce illegal immigration.  Strict 
liability requires employers to adhere to a higher standard and 
penalizes them for any incidents of hiring undocumented 
immigrants without regard to knowledge or fault.  The IRCA, if 
amended as proposed, is capable of putting an end to many of the 
circular debates about illegal immigration. 
If employment opportunities are the single greatest factor in 
influencing the number of undocumented immigrants in this 
country, the lack thereof will discourage millions of these 
workers from entering the United States unlawfully.  As 
legislators have hypothesized, an effective way to reduce illegal 
immigration would be to eliminate one of the “pull” factors—job 
opportunities.201  If newly arrived undocumented immigrants 
realize that they cannot find employment, they will eventually 
inform others in their countries of origin, who will then be 
inclined not to come to the United States illegally.202  As such, 
implementing a strict liability standard where employers are 
penalized for hiring undocumented immigrants without regard to 
knowledge will heighten the level of scrutiny and will certainly 
decrease illegal immigration in the long run. 
 200 See supra Part I.D (highlighting the processes of tentative confirmation and non-
confirmation after the employer has entered prospective employee’s I-9 into E-Verify). 
 201 MAGAÑA, supra note 7, at 37. 
 202 Id. 
